Shipbucket

See what packing 2000 California national guardsmen onto three obsolete sail and steam cruisers will do to a timeline?

Incidentally Admiral Ramsey in this AU is the American admiral in charge of the Pacific sea frontier. His counterpart is Henry Erben in the Atlantic, the guy who talks to the parrot, Gertrude. More on that joker in a day or two.

THE AU VERSION OF THE VON DEDERICHS DEBACLE AND LUNA’S SHENANIGANS

About von Dederichs, a brief biography^3 and ^4:
^3 National Archives, Washington D.C. Records Group 45, Subject File VI-8, “Notes regarding assistance desired by Germany from the United States in forming a Navy, 1848-1849.”

Also;

^4 “Officer Training in the Prussian Navy: The Professionalization of the Naval Officer Corps in the 1860s” Gottschall, Terrell Walla Walla College International Journal of Naval History Vol.1 #1 (April 2002)

The central impression that I took away from these articles, was how inept the Americans thought the Germans were, (National Archives) and how incompetent the Captain of the Prussian training ship “Niobe” was International Journal, and how inept von Dederichs, himself, proved to be also during his “midshipman cruise” as he records events in his own diary. From knocking sailors overboard during boat drills to being trapped in the rigging to setting the Niobe on fire and almost blowing her up, the Prussian midshipman class of 1865 was not too swift. From that class would come some of the stellar lights that would lead the Kriegsmarine to inglory up (Tirpitz was another “cadet” on embarked upon that rather infamous cruise.) to and during the WWI. Von Dederichs was nepotized into the class after flunking out of the Prussian army and going the merchant officer’s route on a German tramp freighter headed to China to obtain his masters papers. Judging by his prior recorded in his own words experience in this circuitous path to acceptance as the oldest midshipman of his class (early 20s, the others were boys in their mid to late teens into the Prussian naval academy) , Von Dederichs pathhad to be smoothed over by family political connections.

Uneventful was von Dederich’s service during the Prussian Danish War, the Prussian Austrian War and likewise during the Franco Prussian War where the Prussian navy cowered in its ports except for that little gunboat duel off Havana between the German ship Meteor, and the French messenger boat Bouvet. The result of that fracas was that both ships shot up each other’s rigging and one German sailor was killed. The Bouvet retreated under sail when her steam engine conked out due to mechanical failure and not battle damage. On the basis of that “retreat” the Germans claim victory.

Otherwise zippo.

Von Dederichs obtained his captaincy of the SM gunboat Natter in that war and road the war out at anchor at Kiel. From what one can find out about Natter, she was a brand new flat-bottomed barbette turreted gunboat of the type known derisively by the Americans as a flat-iron. Popular with the Russians and the Germans as a cheap means to defend a harbor, these floating batteries were naval disasters waiting to happen. Many of the decrepit Russian “battleships” at Tsushima were over-glorified examples of this type abomination. This being in 1905.

Herr von Dederichs went on to graduate with the first class (1877) to matriculate in the Kriegsmarine version of the Prussian army’s staff officer school, often confused as being equivalent to the first national grand strategy university to ever be created (US Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island, 1892.).

After that he went to a gunnery training ship as instructor, did a tour at the German navy’s torpedo directorate, and was posted afloat and ashore to various commands and schools as student and instructor, finally obtaining his squadron command of the German East Asia Squadron with orders to secure a concession similar to the one the British enjoyed in Hong Kong. He accomplished that mission in November 1897 through threats and bluffs. He is about to try the same trick one year later to seize another naval base concession and possibly add the Philippines to the German East Indies by obtaining concessions from the Spanish and the Filipinos before the Americans can get organized. He will play that game of risk out with catastrophic results at Manila Bay when the Americans react to it.

General Antonio Luna’s side story:

This Filipino hero, and whatever you may think of him as a faux would-be Spanish grandee in the Philippines setting, an errant womanizer, a fraud, an embezzler, an outright chicane and all around poseur, (in all the meanings as the Spanish, the French, the Belgians, and finally the Americans come to know him), he is a genuine hero in the true sense of the word. He comes from a gifted family of sons which produces a lawyer, a doctor and him; the best of the excellent lot. He chooses a career as a cross between a pharmacist, an apothecary and a chemist. And he is good at it, sufficiently so to become a fellow at the Pasteur Institute. He is an inspired new man, an Illustrado (Filipino intellectual) of the first rank. He contributes to La Solidaridad and is a ringleader of the Propaganda Movement and later he tries out to become a soldier, studying under the Belgian tactician [later General] Gérard Leman who will conduct the defense of Liege against the Germans during the First World War. Luna will discover that an enemy who knows how to break siege lines will break them easily just as Leman will fifteen years later. In the case of the Germans; Otto von Emich and Erich Ludendorff needed 30,000 Germans, 5 days and 140 siege mortars and field guns to overcome about 28,000 Belgians in their forts. It takes Anderson, Otis and MacArthur with their regiments about two hours, with the guns of Dewey’s fleet, in support to break Luna’s lines around south Manila. That is hardly a fair comparison, one might say. Leman had 240 guns and those 28,000 trained reasonably armed European troops. He is not fighting the best Germans to be sure. Still the comparison to Luna is unfair.

Is it? Those trenches are manned by about 9000 Filipino Katipunan bolo men in well-made trench works that astonish the Americans who storm them. MacArthur, Anderson and Otis have mostly National Guard troops, about 5,000 men between them in their assault units. Never seen a battle in their lives, have most of them. Antonio Luna along his front (the Zapote line a lot of it), has made sure that he follows the best French and Spanish practice as he picks fortifiable ground. And he does have enough captured and looted ordnance from the Spanish elsewhere in the Philippines (Mainly Pangasinan Province) to make a bloody fight of it, if his men will stand their ground. That is the real time line.

How does it happen in the RTL that the smoldering Siege of Manila is so easily lifted? Well… Arthur MacArthur has seen this elephant before, as a young subaltern in George Thomas’ Army 1864. Missionary Ridge, Chattanooga, Tennessee is where. Another enemy has then misread a patch of ground, places his trenches and artillery in the wrong spots, has posted green troops and assigns
incompetent amateur officers (Jackson and Stevens for Bragg, del Pilar for Luna) to hold it, and assumes things will be all right, because nobody would be stupid enough to attack uphill against such formidable heights or across such uncrossable ground. Luna is no Braxton Bragg, but the same ingredients for a disaster are present opposite at Blockhouses 6 and 7 in the RTL. And the Americans want to force the issue. MacArthur gets together with Generals Otis and Anderson. He, too, is tired of Filipinos sniping at his troops from those trenches.

Why is Luna egging the Americans on? He has to know that sooner or later, the raids, ambushes and the sniping at American patrols will bring on general battle. The explanation is simple. The Americans, 30 days away in San Francisco, arrive in shuttle convoys, two regiments at a time like clockwork every two weeks and in the ten months that Aguinaldo has fiddled around in negotiating with Dewey, Merritt, and now MacArthur; 25,000 of them or about 18 regiments, the whole of 8th Corps and elements of 9th Corps are in the Philippines, some 18,000 in and around Manila, alone.

Even if there are 40,000 men in the Philippine Army of Liberation as claimed, that is not going to be enough for what is coming. Luna has been trying to force Aguinaldo’s hand, and now he has done it.

A Private Grayson, an Englishman, with the usual 19th century one step ahead of the constable baggage, who for reasons (ahem) of his own, enlists in the 1st Nebraska Volunteers, is the spark. One does not know why Grayson does it, but when on patrol outside Blockhouse 7 of the Zapote Line, ostensibly as part of a measure to guard the west end of the San Juan Bridge leading into Manila, the 3 man squad of which he is a member; that patrol challenges a Filipino 4 man patrol rousting around the countryside with much the same orders as they have; only for the east end. Check and validate entries into and out of a controlled area. There is immediately an argument between the two squads about an American strongpoint and camp in the nearby village of Santa Mesa where the 1st Nebraska Volunteers has bivouacked a few units. Now this is not new. Arguments have been going on since June (RTL) about American troops holding this bridge and occupying that village. Sniping and night ambushes of American patrols have been routine from the Filipino side of the no man's land. Colonel Stotsenberg of the 1st Nebraska finally tells his line officer of this sector to defend Santa Mesa and the bridge nearby against all comers. That man details that order to the American patrols he sends out. So once again an argument breaks out, over whom controls the area. NCOs and junior officers cannot settle it this time over rum, so runners are sent for senior officers, and the two squads face off rifles at the ready.

Something happens or maybe it is pre-arranged with this patrol this time, but whatever it is, Grayson suddenly takes it upon himself to act without orders. He shoots at a Filipino soldier, who he claims threatens him with his rifle.

And that starts both immediate lines shooting at each other. Senior officers on the Filipino side, especially Aguinaldo, but significantly not Luna, send emissaries to the scene to arrange a cease fire and a truce with the Americans. There is a parley in which General Otis essentially tells Aguinaldo’s emissary that hostilities once commenced are not going to be curtailed. “Let it play out.” Otis says.

Yeah. Luna is a better general than Aguinaldo, but a worse politician. Aguinaldo plays the long game. He seeks to use American politics against itself. The US Senate has just shelved the Treaty of Paris, because the anti-imperialism faction of the Democratic Party won a floor fight with the help of some pacifist Republicans. It looks like the treaty may be rejected.

And then Dewey sends word (not MacArthur, DEWEY), that the Philippine Army of Liberation has attacked their American “allies”. This rodent stinks among those who know; even back in 1899, but the popular press runs with the news, McKinley decides to “Let it play out.” in his fashion. And the conquest war is on.

Part of that conquest war is the Battle of Manila in 1899. Dewey in agreement with the Spaniards does not shell into Manila, even during the sham battle that happens August 16, 1899 to take it over from Jaudenes who sells his command out to the Americans. This time on the 4th and 5th of February 1899, the navy, in accordance with American army planning, fires over the city to just beyond into the Zapote line and the Americans attack in a full scale assault on a 20 kilometer front.

This shocks the Filipinos, even Luna, who are used to the Spaniards retreating into fortified posts and beating off Filipino attacks and incidents with a shrug of the shoulders. That is the way it has been done for 300 years in the Philippine Islands.

Local Filipino success occurs where a Luna trained battalion, on their own initiative, overruns a surprised US artillery position further up the line and captures a gun section (3rd US Artillery had to run for it after beating off the first human wave charge, when their support infantry runs to the rear. Boy does that raise a stink when MacArthur gets wind of it.), before the Americans counterattack and massacre them in a reverse rout. MacArthur more or less runs his battle, otherwise, as a tabletop exercise, aiming for the San Mesa Ridge, the Chinese Hospital and the La Loma cemetery. General Anderson to the south attacks in three columns (typical American cavalry tactic, also very un-Spanish), and catches General Pio del Pilar with his pants down (literally, he is caught en flagrante delecto by the messenger with the news that the Americans are attacking.). This is the incompetent that General Luna thinks can hold the lines he lays out and designs for the south? Anderson’s battalions rout the Filipino troops with the aid of that naval gunfire Dewey supplies in full measure. Most of del Pilar’s men have to cross the Pasig River to escape. Many Filipinos drown or are shot while they swim for it.

Otis' men just bulldoze ahead and chase off the Filipinos in front of them. Otis is not subtle like MacArthur or dashing like Anderson.

The Americans estimate they kill about 300 and wound twice as many in the battle. They underplay the casualties, one suspects, to not look like the butchers they are, even to their own jingoistic press. They take maybe 300 prisoners. It is an easy success for them all along that 20 kilometer line. That is the RTL result. It is this disaster that along with Luna's siphoning monies out of the Katipunan Movement treasury to maintain his mistress and some other shenanigans which involve fellow Filipino officers (and in one case one officer's wife), that finally compels Aguinaldo to have his best general killed in an outright assassination.

The result of the Luna assassination is predictable. Kill George Washington and the American Revolution disintegrates into splintered factions which can be stomped out, one faction at a time. The Americans, at least their military men, know this certainty from their own history. With Luna gone, the Philippine army disintegrates into tribalism and warlordism. The Americans are very good at fighting "Indians", tribe by tribe.

General Otis says it again; "Aguinaldo has killed his only general. Let it play out. We have them."

In the AU, all of this actually turns out much worse because the Filipinos are about to pay for Luna's mistakes compounded in synchronized time with von Dederich's own gross blundering.

What does one mean? Aguinaldo according to the evidence is always a good politician thwarted by bad advice and poor timing. It almost blows up in his face the first time, when the Americans catch Filipino and German emissaries talking to each other. Aguinaldo weasels his way out of that one by disavowing the Filipinos involved, and of course von Dederichs (one suspects he lies about it), claims as one military man to another to Dewey (before the Irene Incident shows his true intents.); "I know nothing about it. They are German adventurers who have no official standing in the Kaiser's service."

Hah. Dewey bides his time. In the RTL he runs his own bluff and wins and thereby saves inadvertently Aguinaldo, but in this AU timeline, Dewey has better options than bluff. Remember the Ramsey expeditions, both RTL (Guam, Wake, Hawaii) and in the AU, (I added a few)? That is not all our energetic able Admiral Ramsey is doing in this AU. And there is General Merritt ne MacArthur. With things happening in August in this AU, instead of May, the Americans have more time, better plans and in this AU, a few technical surprises for both von Dederichs, Luna, and the hapless unfortunate Aguinaldo.

See what happens next.

THIS ONE IS A LULU.

Just two of the lulus that von Dederichs and Aguinaldo have no idea are headed their way in this AU.

Hi Tobius.

The life in the main mast observation post would be very hot and «fummy» (and the heat also can cause distortions to the optics). And the bow is somewhat low, so it would be wet. I think that a deck taller would improved the seakeeping capabilities with no to much increase of the weight. Cheers.

This seems awfully advanced for an 1890's navy... propeller shrouds and superfiring turrets in 1900? Seems a little ahead of its time for me... it's your AU though and you can do whatever you want with it.

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Best regards,

RegiaMarina1939

Refer to Rear admiral [eventually] David W. Taylor, USN. He was a super genius. Blame him for it. He's a father of modern [American] warship hull design and propeller theory. I date it to 1893 as a result of work he did on Blade Element Theory. The rationale goes thus:

1. The American submersibles in this AU are near surface or semi-submerged 1890s versions of the 1870s torpedo ram concept. (USS Intrepid [1874] for example, since apparently it beat HMS Polyphemus into the water by half a decade [`1880].). As the experiments with torpedo rams show that their employment is subject to shallow water conditions existent which are reeds and shallow water plants with long stringy fronds and the bottoms are rocky as well as muddy inside American harbors and in lee shore anchorages, especially in semitropical Caribbean shore lines (this is the operating area of greatest concern to the American navy as a coast defense navy of the era) and as torpedo rams are ambush weapons, the physical needs for propeller guards quickly become evident.

2. A Brayton engine is an early heavy oil engine (kerosene) of the 1880s. If adopted as a marine plant, it has to be huge, related in ratio to the inside usable volume of a hull because of the complex ducting required for the compressor, expander, turbine, burner and heat exchanger. That does not make it a heavy engine complex, but the piping and the cooler required makes it a huge one in area used, especially for a submarine.

3. The first American submersible designs are based on USN experience with the Hunleys, the Davids, and with the new-fangled automobile torpedo. One of the problems the Americans find early (Brayton engine complexes generate a lot of torque but not necessarily high rpms, so that means large diameter low rpm propellers), is that huge torque load from the engines available puts a twist moment on the submarine hull. This makes handling the submersible moving in the 3-d maneuvering environment "interesting and awkward" in shallow water especially. Two ways to counter; a, use a larger surface fin and elevon control area on the side opposite to screw spin to counteract through Bernoulli Effect, as is done with modern subs, and single propeller driven aircraft, or counter-spin a mass or drag effect to cancel the torque load. That is how Robert Whitehead eventually solves the roll tendency in his first torpedoes. The Americans apply it to the whole submersible. A shroud does not materially affect the counter-spin effect, but Whitehead does shroud some of his earlier torpedo props as a (hot run) safety measure. Primate perceive, primate perform likewise. The Americans (especially Holland) think they are dealing with the same problems scaled up that then confront the automobile torpedo. They did not know why, but if the English did it, they could/would and did try it for torpedoes. Kort ducting in a tow tank (refer to David Taylor, again, who is the first American to employ one, though I think the Dutch beat him to it by a decade.) will show up immediately. Works for a torpedo, apply it to a sub. This is the Rube Goldberg age of reheaters and triple expansion steam engines. Complex trial by error workarounds for dimly understood mechanical and physical reasons are the norm, and when they work become the new norm.

4. Up to 5 meters a second, that Kort effect is useful; especially in near surface or semi-submerged conditions where maneuvering with a large low RPM screw is dicey (tugboats). So it is three decades early? The people who actually develop all these concepts are doing most of the theoretical work around 1890-1900. There is no mechanical or physical reason why this is impossible to test and develop in water where floating is easy, unlike say the airplane, where the three axis control problem in mid-air awaits a suitable lightweight compact engine and the practical engineering work to design lifting airfoils, integrated airflow control systems and screws optimized for thrust just to get off the ground and attain flight, just to see what actually works. The airplane before 1905 and the Wright Brothers is impossible, so one will not see one here. (Dirigibles, sure, but not airplanes.).

5. A ducted propeller Brayton engined submarine? Conservative engineers delay implementation. The all electric type sub with the snort is possible in 1895. (Look at the early Holland designs.) Why not build it? Because most submarine development follows, first the French and then the German models. Diving torpedo boat. With deck gun. Compromises with hull space, range, speed, endurance, types of weapons available... you will get a U-cruiser that relies on its deck gun using the European tradition. Not until the torpedo becomes the main and only weapon and ASW defenses force submerged operations do the Germans go whole hog for the true underwater boat. They had good reasons for sticking with what they know until circumstances force radical changes to the accepted paradigm.

6. As stated above, the harbor defense torpedo ram of 1890-1905 as an ambush weapon, if it dives to hide, lie in wait, and torpedo its prey, will not use the gun. It will use the extremely short ranged torpedo of the day. It will be designed accordingly. That is the starting American tradition (Refer to Holland's Fenian Rams, they were even called RAMS, because of the way the Americans thought the boats would be employed.). The boats will have to be controllable, agile in shallow waters, and capable of dash speeds.

Thus the Charpwick one sees makes more counter-history sense in the context of existing American naval trends in the 1890's USN than a dreadnought with a Fiske Bushnell Mark II fire director in 1898-1900. That one is the one reaching for the stars.

Good points. Americans seem unconcerned about freeboard bowward in that era. As late as WW II their battleships were very wet as they plunged into the Pacific swells. Their RTL battleships of the 1890s were considered by the British to be poor seaboats. If I ever do Mister Coolidge's navy (aircraft carriers, yummy!) this problem, they may address.

As for the fighting tops, er fire directors, the problem seems endemic to every warship that works in the tropics or temperate zones down to the present. Optics for obvious reasons have to be sealed. But aside from that factor, these are American warships. They are funny in design.

Refer to the USS Arizona of 1939 refit here. The interferometric rangefinder (Object 19 on the list) is a sealed unit atop the chart and track compartment.

Note again on the battleship Texas. That earlier example is a greenhouse atop a open piped tower amidships. Uncomfortable is a charitable word to describe the situation the chart and track parties endured.

Discussion here.

The directors do have problems. They are the first and second iterations of the type technology (in this AU) the Americans ever employ. The directors should have problems. See above what that means at the Battle of Tenerife.

The fire control station in the after fire control tower on BB-35 is below the top of the stack, so I doubt smoke would be that big of an issue.

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