Shipbucket

What are the gem-like things on the rifle stocks?

I have a feeling the typical pragmatic Americans of the time would likely not bother with such extravagance, but I suppose artistic license does exist...

........................................................He wore in his belt an old original
"Allen" revolver, such as irreverent people called a "pepper-box." Simply
drawing the trigger back, cocked and fired the pistol. As the trigger
came back, the hammer would begin to rise and the barrel to turn over,
and presently down would drop the hammer, and away would speed the ball.
To aim along the turning barrel and hit the thing aimed at was a feat
which was probably never done with an "Allen" in the world. But George's
was a reliable weapon, nevertheless, because, as one of the stage-drivers
afterward said, "If she didn't get what she went after, she would fetch
something else." And so she did. She went after a deuce of spades nailed
against a tree, once, and fetched a mule standing about thirty yards to
the left of it. Bemis did not want the mule; but the owner came out with
a double-barreled shotgun and persuaded him to buy it, anyhow. It was a
cheerful weapon--the "Allen." Sometimes all its six barrels would go off
at once, and then there was no safe place in all the region round about,
but behind it.

--Mark Twain, Roughing It

(This account is a fictionalized version of Admiral Montojo’s actual account of the battle.)

Admiral Montojo’s Report:

DEPARTURE FOR SUBIC

On the 23rd of July, at 11 P.M., I left the bay of Manila for Subic with a squadron composed of the cruisers REINA CRISTINA, REINA REGENTE, DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA, ISLA DE CUBA, ISLA DE LUZO, dispatch boat MARQUES DEL DUERO, and the wooden cruiser CASTILLA. This last ship by heroic exertions of the Cavite naval depot could previously merely be considered as a floating battery, incapable of maneuvering, on account of the bad condition of her hull, but the carpenters’ repairs to the ship and the mechanics’ work upon her engines have restored her to some usefulness. The following morning, being in Subic, I had a conference with Captain Del Rio, who, though he did not relieve my anxiety respecting the completion of the defensive works, assured me that they would soon be finished..
On the morning of the 25th, I sailed with these vessels to cover the entrance to the port of Subic. The CASTILLA was posted to the northeast point of Isla Grande to defend the western entrance, since the eastern entrance had already been closed with the hulls of the SAN QUINTIN and two old merchant vessels which were sunk there. With much disgust, I found that the guns which should have been mounted on that island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the entrance of Manila Bay, under the intelligent direction of Colonel of Naval Artillery, Senor Garces, and Lieutenant Venavente, were ready to fight twenty-four days after the commencement of the work. I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few torpedoes which they found feasible to put there. The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Americans with its own resources, in 40 meters of water and with little security. Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews. I still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us more time for preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish consul at Hong Kong a telegram which said *Enemy squadron sailed at 2 P.M. from the bay of Mira, and according to reliable accounts they sailed for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila.

This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find my squadron and that the port of Subic had no defenses. The same day, the 27th of July, I convened a council of the captains, and all, with the exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal, thought that the situation was insupportable, and that we should go to the bay of Manila in order to accept there the battle under less unfavorable conditions.

THE RETURN TO MANILA

I refused to have our ships near the city of Manila, because, far from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which doubtless would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It was unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Canacao, in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the batteries of Point Sangley and Ulloa. I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most strategic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and stores before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with sand to defend the water line of the CASTILLA’S hull against the enemy*s shells and torpedoes. I sent for Lieutenant Villicentes and gave him his final instructions for the manned spar torpedo boats in where to post them at the head of our line and exactly when to use them. At 10 A.M. on the 29th I left Subic with the vessels of my squadron, accompanied by the transport MANILA to bring back the otherwise troops at the Subic who would be better employed by Del Rio at the Juanita and Isabella batteries. In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Cacacao in 8 meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line of battle, the CRISTINA, CASTILLA, DON JUAN DE AUSTRIA, DON ANTONIO DE ULLOA, LUZON, CUBA, and MARQUES DEL DUERO, while the empty transport MANILA was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the VELASCO and LEZO were undergoing repairs.

At 7 P.M. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy*s squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our ships, and from there they sailed with course for Manila. The mail steamer ISLA MINDANAO arrived in the bay. I advised her captain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get into the entrance probably before midnight. As he was not authorized from the trans-Atlantic he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor. At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning of the 1st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which they had exchanged numerous shots. I notified the commanding general of the arsenal, Senor Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Captain Senor Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery to be loaded, and all sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle, soon to receive the enemy. This is all that occurred since I sailed to Subic until the entrance of the American squadron into the bay of Manila.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ENEMY

The squadron being disposed for action, boilers fired, and everything in proper place, we waited the enemy*s arrival. All the vessels, having been painted dark gray color, had taken down their masts and yards and boats to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly. At 4 A.M. I made a signal to prepare for action, and at 4.45 the AUSTRIA signaled the enemy*s squadron, few minutes after which they were recognized, organized with some confusion, in a column parallel with ours, at 6,000 meters distant; the gunboats LAKE CHAMPLAIN and McCULLOUGH in the lead, followed by the flagship OLYMPIA ahead of the other cruisers, followed by ONEIDA, OMAHA and OAKLAND.. The force of these vessels amounted to 21,410 tons, 42,290 horsepower, 100 guns (many of which were rapid fire), 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average speed of advance of about 21 nautical miles per hour. The power of our only five effective ships for battle was represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horsepower, 76 guns (very short of rapid fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum speed of advance of 12 nautical miles per hour.

THE FIRE FROM SHORE

At 5 AM the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The first two shots fell short and to the left of the leading vessel McCULLOUGH. These shots were not answered by the enemy, whose principal object was the squadron. This battery had four Ordonez guns of 15 centimeters mounted, and but one of these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet as three of the guns were not provided with movable trucks that could sweep left and right.. In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 5:15 AM I made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered immediately. The battle became general. We slipped the springs and the cables and started ahead with the engines, so as not to be involved by the enemy as static targets.

THE BATTLE

The Americans fired most deliberately. There came upon us a storm of projectiles, as three cruisers devoted themselves almost entirely to fight the CRISTINA, my flagship. A short time after the action commenced one large shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieut. Jose Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of great commendation, steering until the end of the fight. On the meanwhile another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crews* bags, which they were fortunately able to control.

The enemy shortened the distance between us, and taking time to adjust his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles, many which were grenades. At 7.30 one shell destroyed completely the steering gear. I ordered the engineer to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the meanwhile another shell exploded on the poop and put out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. Another shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, killing the wounded men who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode. Amidships several shells of unknown caliber went through the smokestack and one of the larger ones penetrated the central citadel battery of our gun deck, putting out of action one master gunner and 12 men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.

The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the gun crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with steering, all of whom were out of action.

At this time I gave signal, at the enemy’s closest approach, to Lieutenant Villicentes to make his attacks. He sallied forth with six of his ten launches, four of which could not for various reasons participate, grouped in two groups of three. His intent was to ram the enemy flagship OLYMPIA. The gunboats at the head of the enemy line opened a furious storm of quick fire guns and used their numerous machine guns upon our launches and interposed themselves between the launches and the OLYMPIA. Two of our launches exploded while clearing our own minefierlds. The other four were driven off and had to beach themselves.

THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR SHIPS

The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe, and mast riddled with shot or confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers. I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, making the signal at the same time to the CUBA and LUZON to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the DUERO and the arsenal.

I abandoned the CRISTINA, directing beforehand to secure her flag, and accompanied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the cruiser REINA REGENTE. After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell destroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadaro, who was directing the rescue. The ULLOA, which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns which remained available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, putting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which were only remaining for the service of the two guns stated. The CASTILLA, which fought heroically, remained with her artillery useless, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy*s shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Algado. The casualties on this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded.

The AUSTRIA, very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the CASTILLA. The LUZON had three guns dismounted, and was slightly damaged in the hull. The DUERO remained with one of her engines useless, the bow gun of 12 centimeters and one of the redoubts. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the bottom of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment and that they should be sunk before they surrendered.

THE SINKING

At 10.30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal and the ships which remained to me, opened upon them a horrible fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had operable. There remained the last recourse to sink our remaining vessels, and we accomplished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguished pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns, and the signal codes. After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de Cavite, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.

THE JUDGEMENT OF THE ADMIRAL

It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quartermasters, gunners, sailors, and soldiers rivalled one another in sustaining with honor the good name of the navy on this sad day. The insufficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, and lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon and machine guns, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country and to prevent the possibilityof the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction that with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going to certain death and could expect the loss of all our ships.

Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men killed and wounded.

Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón

(As with Montojo, this is a fictionalized version of the Dewey account, sent to Navy Secretary Long post battle. As I find in the real battle report he sent, in the footnotes I've included for this AU version, are some curious omissions and exaggerations Commodore Dewey makes.

U.S. NAVAL FORCE ON ASIATIC STATION,
FLAGSHIP "OLYMPIA”.
CAVITE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, August 14, 1898

SIR:

I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the squadron under my command: The squadron left Kir Bayon on July 12, immediately on the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies the squadron. Arrived off Bolinao^1 on the morning of July 25 and, finding no vessels there, proceeded to send a small away party from the McIntosh to ascertain a suitable landing spot for a beach party. Having determined Tamboc Bay to be a suitable forward anchorage and coaling station, I directed Major Grimes’ Marine detachment to make landings on Anda Island and Dos Hermanos, to establish secure lodgments and make preparations to receive naval and military reinforcements which I expected to arrive shortly from the United States. I left behind the McIntosh and the collier, Nanshan, to support the Marines. The fleet spent the better part of three days, July 25-27, in the vicinity of the Dos Hermanos Islands and Anda to ensure that all necessities for the anchorage was made manifest and that the Marine beachhead was made secure.

With the rest of the fleet I then proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the 29th.
The McCULLOUGH and ZAFIROD were sent to reconnoiter Port Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the McCULLOUGH and the ZAFIRO, but the Spanish fleet was not found, although from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal (inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their intention to go there. On Grandee Island an abandoned earthworks with four dismounted 16 cm. guns of Schneider Canet type, obviously dismounted from some naval vessel was discovered by an away party sent from the McCULLOUGH. Fearing that the Spaniards might attempt to complete the works and block access to this anchorage behind us, I requested Frank Smythe, business agent, and Captain Hugh Trenchant, of the China and Manila Steamship Company^2 “to keep an eye on things” for us.^2

Entered the Boca Grande, or South Channel, at 11.30 P.M. July 31st, steaming in column at 400 meters interval at 4 meters per second (~8 knots). We commenced mine clearing operations to open a lane through the channel shortly after 12,15 A.M. August 1st . These operations proceeded more slowly than expected, but we made sufficient progress at 1;10 PM that I could order the squadron to proceed directly into the channel past Carabao Island.

After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel opened fire upon us. The ONEIDA returned the fire and silenced the battery after some minutes of exchange. During the exchange, the ONEIDA took casualties and some damage which necessitated that the squadron pause and render her assistance. During this same hiatus, the rest of the lane was cleared through the Spanish minefield. Once the ONEIDA reported she was in satisfactory condition to resume her station, the squadron proceeded through the South Channel and thence across the bay at slow speed, and arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 A.M. by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water in Canacao Bay. The squadron then proceeded to the attack, with the gunboats LAKE CHAMPLAIN and McCULLOUGH in the lead, the flagship OLYMPIA, under my personal direction, heading the cruisers in line, followed at 400 meter interval distance by the ONEIDA, OMAHA and OAKLAND, in the order named, which formation was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5.41 A.M. While advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective.

The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5,000 to 2,000 meters, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective. Early in the engagement two waves of launches, four to eight in total put out toward the OLYMPIA with the apparent intention of using torpoedoes. Two were blown up by apparently steaming into a Spanish minefield and the others disabled by our fire and beached before an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes at us. At 7 A.M. the Spanish flagship REINA CRISTINA made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the OLYMPIA being concentrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started in her by our shells at this time were not extinguished until she sank. At 7.35 A.M., it having been erroneously reported to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 15 cm rapid fire battery aboard the OLYMPIA, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if necessary.

The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance to the Pasig River, the second on the south bastion of the walled city of Manila, and the third Malate, about one-half mile farther south. At this point a message was sent ashore under flag of truce to the Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing the city would be razed post fleet action. This had the effect of silencing them.

At 11.16 A.M., finding that the report of scarcity of ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12:30 P.M. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt, and deserted. At 12.40 P.M. the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the McCULLOUGH being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible.

The Spanish fleet lost the following vessels: Sunk - REINA CRISTINA, REINA REGENTE, CASTILLA, DON ANTONIO de ULLOA. Burnt - DON JUAN de AUSTRIA, ISLA de LUZON, ISLA de CUBA, GENERAL LEZO, MARQUES del DUERO, EL CORREO, VELASCO, and ISLA de MINDANAO (transport). Captured - RAPIDO and HERCULES (tugs) and several small beached launches.

I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded, but believe their loss to be very heavy. The REINA CRISTINA alone had 150 killed, including her captain, and 90 wounded. I am happy to report that damage done to the squadron under my command during this action was acceptable and manageable in what can only be described as an extremely hazardous enterprise^3. As will be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are herewith enclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was repairable, and the squadron is in generallygood condition, post the battle. I beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander-in-chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my command. Captain Frank Wildes, commanding the OAKLAND, volunteered to remain in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving Hongkong. Assistant Surgeon C. P. Kindleberger, of the OLYMPIA, and Gunner J. C. Evans, of the OAKLAND also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them had arrived. The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P. Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position, and gave me most efficient aid. Lieutenant T. M. Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign W. P. Scott, aid, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable manner. The OLYMPIA being short of officers for the battery, Ensign H. H. Caldwell, flag secretary volunteered for and was assigned as captain to number 2 turret of the 20 cm battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my aid, and rendered valuable service.

While leaving to the commanding officers to comment on the conduct of the officers and men under their commands, I desire especially to mention the coolness of Lieutenant C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the OLYMPIA, and commander of the tracking party, who came under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the calculated ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proven by the excellence of the firing. On August 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and magazines of the batteries there. The first battery, near the end of Sangley Point, was composed of four modern Trubia B. L. rifles of ~15 centimeters caliber. The second was one mile farther down the beach, and consisted of 4 modern Schneider Canet 12-centimeter B. L. rifles behind improvised earthworks.^4
On the 2nd the military forces evacuated the Cavite arsenal, which was taken possession of by a landing party from the OMAHA. On that same day the OAKLAND and ONEIDA secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, paroling the garrison and destroying the guns. On the morning of May 4 the transport MANILA, which had been aground in Bakor Bay, was towed off and made a prize.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE DEWEY,
Commodore, U. S. Navy
Commanding U.S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington, D. C.