Shipbucket

And finally cleaned up.

When we speak of Mr. McKinley's Navy, we have to begin somewhere and generally that is supposed to be with the SS Virginius Affair and proceed from there.

The conventional wisdom is that it was the humiliation that the US suffered having to follow in the bow wake of the powerful British who threatened Spain with war over the affair. The 53 Americans and British fillibusters the Spanish executed for their alleged attempt to overthrow the Spanish administration in Cuba was the proximate cause for war, and the humiliation was the realization that the US Navy and Army was too feeble to do anything about it.

It was remarkable that the Johnson Administration had so scrapped the fleet and so allowed the shore establishment to run down that the Grant administration which followed it was unable to do anything but conform to British diktats (moreso than Spain) about the episode.

However, the real beginnings for Mr. McKinley's Navy have to be seen earlier and later than the SS Virginius, and it has to be rooted in more causes than just colliding American and Spanish interests in the Caribbean-> especially if the causes are to be tweaked into a slightly different outcome.

Once again we must look to SPAIN as the first enemy and this cause. The bombardment of Valpariso was something American political leaders had to consider.

If that lesson needed to be reinforced, the bombardment of Alexandria, Egypt and the battle of Fuzhou drove home the reality that American leaders (presidents) faced in the late 19th century. From Grant forward, they wanted a powerful navy to defend the Atlantic ports from European strategic blackmail, but not until Cleveland's first administration was a serious attempt to actually address the peculiar and uniquely American defense issues taken in hand.

Not only was the political climate suitable as the SS Virginius affair still rankled deeply with each new outrage that Spain perpetrated in "American" waters, but the technological chaos that became evident with the Franco Prussian War and which continued with the naval side-shows and demonstrations since thereafter (the heyday of Franco-British "gunboat diplomacy") when the lesser third tier powers (of which the United States was one) could expect an Anglo French allied fleet to show up and tell the local government to behave or see a seaport shelled into ruins, finally settled down to something stable.

That technological chaos was based on two fundamental factors; manufacture of good steel armored plate, and the manufacture of the built up hooped breech loading guns to throw explosive projectiles between 6 and 15 kilometers. The other ancillaries, such as automated computing and fire director systems to support such armored guns either ashore or afloat, and the steam, hydraulic, electrical, or internal combustion engines to move that armored artillery made their ancillary appearances, but that was the fundamental two factors practical solved that settled down by 1885. Railroad guns and the primarily steam engine propelled armored warship became well defined enough in technology plateau limits internationally, that the Americans could finally be confident that they could meet it with their native resources.

The "excuse" was to make the US coasts secure against second-rate powers like Spain. That would be the bill of deceitful goods sold to an isolationist Congress. The real dream though, was to remove the humiliation of ever seeing another American commodore helpless to intervene as the US Mediterranean squadron was when the French and the British shelled not only Egyptian interests, but American and Italian interests and PROPERTY and CITIZENS in Alexandria, Egypt as well as in Chinese ports in the Pacific.

Coastal forts would stand the European interlopers offshore, but to protect Americans overseas, the US would need a very strong navy.

And that leads to a curiosity. America in the age of sail, could get away with lease basing and relying on foreign ports for their frigate/sail cruiser navy. It was not innate conservatism among American ship captains that made them reluctant to abandon sails as a propulsion system. The USN had no safe overseas bases to re-coal. Steam engine plants were weak and unreliable. The British had good steam engine plants and coaling stations everywhere. And they had a huge numbers advantage.

The French since their humiliation during the Franco Prussian War had decided to assuage their national humiliation by continuing Louis Napoleon's foreign policy of adventurism. Maybe France could not beat the Germans in Europe, but France could beat everyone else overseas (except the British) and thereby restore her tarnished glory that way?

I could point out that the Chinese had something to say about that in Indo-China, and that things did not go well for France in Japan, but for the most part, the French were right in the 1870s and 1880s and they were a primary cause of American concern and anger in the Pacific those decades as the French strongly interfered with American commercial exploration in Asian markets.

Not to say that the Americans were alone, but the British could do something about it (Suez Canal) and often did. Not until Mister McKinley's navy (the real one not this AU one) showed its teeth (Spanish American War) did the Panama Canal happen and the admirals in Paris finally read the {US) plot. They were through as a global navy.

The British would take longer, much longer.

But what about the Germans?

Well, they never got out there and developed the infrastructure or the practical means for a global navy. Not really. They; like the Italians and the Russians of the era, were a local regional power with a limited out of region overseas presence.

How does a navy with no overseas bases and coaling stations become a global navy and fight a global naval war?;

That is a good question for Grover Cleveland's Secretary of the Navy William Collins Whitney.

And one we will explore in the AU. You already see some early examples.

General characteristics: USS Codfish class
Class & type: Submarine
Displacement: 128 long tons (130 t) surfaced
148 long tons (150 t) submerged

Length: 132 ft 1 in (40.41 m) LOA
Beam: 20 ft 8 in (6.3 m) extreme
Draft: 16 ft 6 in (5 m)
Propulsion: 1 × Otto gasoline engine, 180 bhp (136 kW)
1 × Electro Dynamic electric motor, 220 bhp (224 kW)
198-cell Exide battery
1 shaft

Speed: 8 knots (15 km/h; 9.2 mph) surfaced
5 knots (9.3 km/h; 5.8 mph) submerged

Complement: 6
Armament: 2 × 18 inch (457 mm) torpedo tube (3 torpedoes)
1 × 8.4 inch (210 mm) dynamite gun

Safe diving depth: Not greater than 180 feet (55 meters)
Endurance: 100 hours on the Otto engine (Model 1885) at 7 kn (8 mph, 13 km/hr.)

General characteristics USS Fulton class
Class & type: C-2 class submarine
Displacement: 400 long tons (410 t) surfaced
516 long tons (524 t) submerged
Length: 184 ft (56 m)
Beam: 26 ft 4 in (8 m)
Draft: 18 ft in (5.5 m)
Speed: 14 kn (16 mph; 26 km/h) surfaced
Propulsion: 1 × Otto gasoline engine, 1080 bhp (816 kW)
1 × Electro Dynamic electric motor, 1320 bhp (1344 kW)
10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h) submerged
Complement: 4 officers and 22 men
Armament: 3 × 18 in (460 mm) torpedo tubes (3 internally in bow), 5 torpedoes

Safe diving depth: Not greater than 360 feet (165 meters)
Endurance: 300 hours on the Otto engine (Model 1892) at 10 kn (11 mph, 18.5 km/hr.)

The submarine (as the submerged torpedo ram) was a sneaky weapon with which the Americans were very familiar from their civil war.

There's nothing like a long range plan for securing an international infrastructure and an overseas presence to fat markets.

Let's look at what those American objectives around 1885-1890 might look like?

A. Why the Canary Islands? Those belong to Spain at the moment, subject to seizure in any war with the Spanish and it would be a place for forward basing a US Mediterranean fleet that would need a place of its own independent of leasing arrangements with a host nation. It sits athwart trade routes from Europe to Africa.
B. Cuba, another Spanish colony geographically dominates the Caribbean and acts as gatekeeper between the US and South America trade routes from southern US ports to northeastern and eastern South American ports.
C. Ditto Puerto Rico. Take Cuba and Puerto Rico together and the British and French are finished in the New World and in South America, since it is their hitherto dominant geographic presences in the Caribbean that has throttled American trade to South America.
D. Isthmus canal. If Suez cut the time to India for Britain, what would an Isthmus canal mean for American Atlantic ports access to East Asia?
E. Hawaii is first link
F. Carolines/Gilberts
G. Marianas Islands
I. Philippine Islands
J. What we know as the Bismarks
K. Assorted islands in the South China Sea.

Notice that in the 1885 to 1890 time-frame that most of these objectives were part of the doddering Spanish Empire, especially the important Caribbean and Pacific objectives? The whole point of the exercise is to fit an interlocking system of secure owned anchorages and coaling stations to dominate trade routes from American ports on both coasts to East Asia and to South America. It is American mercantile imperialism that is designed to supplant European colonialism. And if it works, it will finish Europe as the dominant power block on Earth.

Now doesn't THAT sound familiar? It should. Alfred Thayer Mahan preached it loudly for a long time. People forget about that half of what he wrote about seapower as an American national grand strategy.

The only other part that might be nice to have some influence in would be the Indian Ocean? Diego Garcia would fit the bill nicely?

Britain controls the main choke points at the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden and at the Malay Straits. They did this around the time they competed with France for control of India. Add South Africa and Australia and they effectively insulate the Indian Ocean against all comers in that era.

The only way to break that central stranglehold dominant naval position is to kick them out of the Pacific entirely. (which is why the American program is to take over everything Spanish in that ocean as stepping stones to the China markets and use the French as an excuse to do it.) and dispute the North Atlantic. Again, Spain is the selected victim and the idea is to dispute, not kick the British out of the North Atlantic.

Technical factors are the key. The optimum endurance for American built ships of the era is about eight days steam time at 10 knots. (200 hours or 2000 nautical miles). That is just a little more than a British cruiser's typical endurance of 170 hours (1700 nautical miles). British squadrons were regional based. American squadrons will be expeditionary. They have to be in order to cover the vast distances of the Pacific

That is a major strategic difference. A squadron that is regionally based relies on its base for supply. A squadron that is expeditionary relies on its fleet train.

An anchorage at Diego Garcia is unsustainable. The British can simply choke it off.

The Falklands on the other hand?

These are typical 2nd generation US armored cruisers built to a common pattern and in different shipyards (William Cramp and Sons for the Tallahassee and George Lawley & Son for the Trenton.)

General characteristics

Class & type: T-class armored cruiser
Displacement: 10,670 t (10,500 long tons)
Length: 115.5 m (379 ft)
Beam: 19.5 m (64 ft 0 in)
Draft: 7.9 m (25 ft 11 in)
Installed power: 15,000 ihp (11,185 kW)
Propulsion: 2-shaft triple expansion engines; USS Tallahassee
Propulsion: 3 shaft triple expansion engines; USS Trenton
Speed: 20 knots (37 km/h; 23 mph)
Range: 5,500 nautical miles (10,186 km; 6,329 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph)
Complement: 30 officers and 500 rates (USS Trenton)
27 officers and 490 rates (USS Tallahassee)
USS Trenton:
Armament: 6 × 25.0 cm (9.84 in) / 40 caliber Model 1890 guns
6 × 15.0 cm (5.9 in) /40 caliber Model 1888 guns
18 × 9.0 cm (3.54 in) guns Model 1885 guns
4 × 46 cm (18.11 in) torpedo tubes
USS Tallahassee:
Armament: 6 × 25.5 cm (9.84 in) / 40 caliber Model 1890 guns
6 × 15. cm (5.9 in) /40 caliber Model 1888 guns
20 × 9.0 cm (3.54 in)/35 Model 1885 guns
4 × 46 cm (18.11 in) torpedo tubes
Armor: Belt: 20 cm (7.9 in)
Barbettes: 15 millimetres (5.9 in)
Sloping C Deck: 9 cm (3.54 in) continuous

Interesting AU.

One small question abut the map. I found the passage about the lack of german colonies, so I got this one. But I wonder why Europe is shown with the borders of post 1919. Did I miss this info?
I sometimes have problems with too long English texts, so please forgive me.

_________________
My deviantart account
http://cascadiasb.deviantart.com/?rnrd=191663

I grabbed a map out of image storage. I'll fix it.

What kind of navy does America build?

Objectives drive means. That is an old one, as true in the day of the trireme as it is today in the case of the submarine.

In the 1890s, there were two schools of naval thought. One was properly called commerce warfare and that was the most practical school of naval thought, since the history of naval warfare showed that those who could use the seas were the ones who were most prosperous, at least for the last 400 years of history. America produced a scholar who did the academics on it and he showed how it was the British who practiced commerce warfare on the French, Spanish, and Dutch to drive them from the oceans of the Earth. No commerce = poverty. Napoleon was the last object lesson in how that worked.

The French understood this, but they were not too sure about to undertake commerce warfare against a Britain who could sniff out and snuff out any French attempt to attack British commerce through the conventional means of blockade. So the French (and anyone else who had pretensions to fighting the British) chose guerre de course or releasing a flock of raiders to prey on oceanic commerce in the hopes of scattering the Royal Navy out chasing after the raiders and thereby sneak their way onto the seas.

Well, blockade and major fleet battle was an answer to that French one, and it was this British system which was the one the RN used and which lesser navies imitated if they thought they could get away with it.

That was sort of where the USN fell. But the USN had a major difference of its own.

The Americans had a tradition of offensive naval warfare where the fleet supported the army ashore and was very closely tied to the land campaign. This started in the Revolution when it was a borrowed French fleet that made Yorktown possible. It was the US Navy of the War of 1812 that stopped the British cold on the Great Lakes when the Redcoats were all set to retake upper New York and the Ohio River Valley after the American army had been defeated. The USN was not afraid of the Royal Navy. It never was. That was a powerful morale weapon when you consider how badly the War of 1812 went for the Yanks otherwise.

The Mexican American War as it started was an equal contest with a near run thing at Monterey demonstrating to the Polk Administration that maybe Mexico City by way of Austin as Taylor and the army pushed it was a bad idea. Therefore an expedition to Vera Cruz and further naval operations (Perry and Scott agenda) to support armies in California and voila! Quick victory. Mexico did have a navy and merchant fleet before the war. That was wiped out. Mexico was blockaded and so help (from Britain) was thwarted. The American army had a steady supply of replacements and logistics shipped from New Orleans to Vera Cruz. The 200 kilometer trip to Mexico City was fraught with enormous difficulties, but as long as the replacements and ammunition arrived over the water, Winfield Scott could just crawl along until the Mexicans quit. They quit.

This was repeated in the American civil war. The popular histories actually cover the Mississippi, Tennessee and Cumberland River campaigns quite well. Not so much the Rapidan and Peninsula campaigns (defeats). Whenever the Union armies stuck close to the rivers and hugged the United States Navy tight, there was nothing the rebels could do right. Shiloh, Chattanooga, Knoxville, Savannah, Fort Fisher, Fort Donelson, Island #10, even Petersburg and Vicksburg were NAVAL victories. The side that could use the waters prevailed. What else that is never covered well is that fully half of the Union land campaigns in that civil war were attacks on ports, from the sea and covered and convoyed by the US Navy. More than forty such attacks with the most famous being New Orleans, Mobile Bay, Charleston and Wilmington occurred.

What direct ship to ship combat not involved with hunting down Confederate pirates happened within those operations.

The USN thus had a tradition of finding the enemy navy, beating it, and then landing troops to take over the enemy's useable and accessible ports for its own purposes.

That was not the British pattern model at all. Commerce warfare or guerre de course did not factor.

So what kind of navy with that kind of tradition should America plan if it is not to be a coast defense navy and instead is supposed to project power to use the modern terminology?

--Transports, need those.
--Supply ships, need those.
--Freighters, of course.
--Convoy escorts (armored or protected cruisers)
--and a battle fleet. (Battleships and decent sized scout cruisers)

You are not going to see a lot of small coast defense ships.

So what will the coast guard vessels and defenses be like?

You will see torpedo craft, minefield barriers and coastal artillery fortifications. (railroad guns and mortars).

Stay tuned for those additions.



A little bit of evolution and modernization at work.