That seems to be the Trenton I hunted for.
And that is the Tallahassee.
Refer to the above for the comments and adjustments.
Something to say about why I chose the layouts I did.
One of the things I noticed about turn of the 19th/20th century naval warfare when I first studied it is how misunderstood it is. Popular misconceptions about engagement ranges and naval tactics abound and persist to this day. People of our era used to long ranged engagements scoff at the numerous machine guns and naval howitzers that clutter the superstructures of those quaint ships, and wonder why ships that packed 12 inch naval rifles that could throw shells ten miles, would have reinforced beaked ram bows not too dissimilar from the ancient Greeks at Salamis or the medieval navies at Lepanto.
Well, there are a couple of practical British reasons for that. And since the British were the supposed best at the naval art, most everyone else either imitated them or the French who 'opposed' them.
About the range question.
Time in flight for a shell at the usual 700 m/s muzzle velocity for the SK24/40 of the era is about 2.9-3 seconds to cover the parabola that will carry it slightly more than a mile (about 1750 meters). It's about ~25-26 seconds to 14,000 meters, its max. theoretical effective range.
Of course a ship moving 8 m/s for 25 seconds has moved 200 meters and at 14,000 meters distant that gives you a circular time in flight offset error of 200 meters. Somebody is going to have to invent a continuous update system to predict lead for that drift. (Range clock. 1903) and a way to plot for that drift (Dumaresq 1905)
Until then, it's stadia meter and telescope for the US navy, shooting deliberately every two minutes or so and no shooting beyond 6-8 seconds flight time (4000-6000 meters) for large caliber shells. For a navy with no medium caliber rapid fire guns, that is a huge handicap.
When the Iowa hit the Infanta Maria Theresa with a pair of 12 inch shells at ~2500 meters at Santiago, therefore, that was some mighty fancy shooting from that brand new American ship just using primitive telescopic sights. Whoever laid those shots on had to see through a kerfluffle of American smoke (the Americans did not have smokeless powder propellant for their guns.) and lead a 9 m/s fleeing Spanish target at 1/4 aspect on an opening bearing course. The Americans didn't have the range clocks, the Dresser tables or the coincidence rangefinders that the British would use 16 years later. Furthermore the Iowa gunners had to miss the USS Brooklyn because the Infanta Maria Theresa and the USS Texas were all three danger close to ramming each other, the two Americans by mistake and the Spaniard deliberately. Not exactly contiguous in time, but that was the confusion into which everybody shot that morning.
American shooting was compelled to be slow and methodical because of their artillery and they still mostly missed. They had few, no make that NO rapid fire guns of bore larger than 5.7 cm (6 pounder Hotchkiss) on their ships. The Spanish had the Hontoria 5.5 in (14 cm.) rapid fire gun as their main armored cruiser armament. This was a copied French Schneider Canet design that could spit out 6 shells a minute to the 1 shell per minute that an American 6 inch fired as it was as fast as it was safe to shoot, answered with. The American 5 inch was a slightly faster cyclic at 1 per 45 seconds.
Makes sense to design ships with a large battery of rapid fire guns when you have the certainty that the engagement ranges are three miles (5000 meters) or less (1895) if you are Spain and you follow the European trends.
So why the 12 inch naval guns on pre-dreadnoughts at all? And why usually only four? To prevent the ramming attacks of course and to act as finishing coup de grâce weapons when the opponent was been beaten into a flaming wreck by your rapid fire guns as the USS Texas used her 12 inch gun on Vazcaya after the Brooklyn and that Spaniard slugged it out for an hour.
That is why Spanish armored cruisers carried the seemingly too large Schneider Canet 11 inch mounts they had mounted fore and aft. Imitative of British and hence European naval practice, those guns were put there to stop a rammer and to punch holes in an enemy cripple to finish him off at close range.
But the Americans didn't have any rapid fire guns like that for a pepper box fight.... That's why it took USS Brooklyn an hour to stop the Vazcaya in such a parallel running fight. The Spaniard spat out 300 5.5 inch shells. The Brooklyn answered with about 80-100 8 inch and 5 inch shells of her own. Shooting was at about 1100 meters constant range going both ways.
The Spaniard scored ~20 hits. PH was 5%. The Brooklyn shrugged off a lot of duds and had a lot of holes to patch but at least two Spanish shells functioned, one hit of which wrecked a casemate 5 inch gun (no casualties). But the overall combat effect of these hits on the Brooklyn was zilch.
As a general rule US PH during Santiago was 1% but in this action Brooklyn put maybe 8 shells into Vazcaya to stop her, about half of them 8 inch (3 or 4 hits of the 8? ~7- 10% of the hits out of 40 count of 8 inch fired.) . AFACBD those 8 inch shells did most of the internal damage to Vazcaya and started most of the fires. Vazcaya was shrugging off US 5 inch shells (4-5 hits? of the 60 fired.) which killed exposed topside crew and guns but which wasn't hurting her armored vitals. Exactly what the Spanish armored cruiser's protection scheme was designed to do at those ranges, it did. It kept the medium caliber stuff out of the vitals. Not the larger bore shells though.^1
*1 At the Battle of Manila Bay, the USS Olympia put an 8 inch shell completely the length stern to bow forward through the Reina Christina, and blew the Spanish ship's engine room apart in the process. That one shot put an end to that ship and to any Spanish attempt at all to fight back.
The Texas may have worked Vazcaya over with a couple of coup de grâce 12 inch shots as she beached herself, but that does not change the main findings the Americans discovered when they examined the Spanish wrecks.
Large US caliber guns did most of the critical system kill damage to Spanish ships at Santiago. And it was mostly the cruiser and battleship 8 inch guns which were responsible. Note that at Santiago, those US 8 inch/35s fired once every 2-4 minutes? And they were fired in full broadside salvoes a la Nelson at Trafalgar with much the same devastating results?
Racking and internal explosions in the enemy vitals was what the Americans wanted when they made these choices and that's what they got.
Foreign navies rightfully ballyhooed American naval tactics and their deplorable shooting accuracy, but at least two nations noticed what came out of the Spanish American war.
One was of course, America, who would take 10 years to completely digest the lessons she learned (all or nothing THICK protection being one of those lessons). The other was Italy where a certain Vittorio Cunniberti^1 immediately recognized what had happened to the Spanish and drew the correct conclusions before Tsushima or the Japanese and the Russians would sort of left-hand confirm Santiago's artillery results. The British layout model of large numbers of rapid fire guns as the broadside and the few heavies as incidental hitters did not work. The [American at least] armor was too good at close range for anything under 6 inch and anything like 12 inch which could take up to 3 minutes to fire as a laid on gun would likely mostly miss and be a wasted shot in singles and twos.
And even the 6 inch RFG was suspect. So from where did HMS Dreadnought ultimately come?
Meet the USS Brooklyn.
Six shot broadside, main battery, same caliber and same fall of shot.
And since the Germans were making quick fire guns that at least in the larger calibers were operating at the 1 shot per minute cyclic from 1890 on. (Brass-cased propellants, behind the shell do ease of machine load and cargo handling, just the thing to go with those sliding wedge breech block Krupp guns.) if you need your large caliber guns to shoot fairly quickly and hit in salvo at the 1895 ranges, you can't go wrong with such kinds of guns. The Americans followed [obsolete] French practice and paid for it with some lousy naval artillery about a decade behind the latest British innovations. The Germans were initially on the right track after all. They even had a dry run of it with their first true battleships. They thought that a large caliber main broadside was the theoretical way to go in a naval artillery fight. So six 11 inch guns into a broadside to smash ships, not deter rammings.
^2 Cuniberti, Vittorio, "An Ideal Battleship for the British Fleet", All The World’s Fighting Ships, 1903, pp. 407-409.
All of which the Germans groped toward with their Brandenbergs, but when the mixed caliber main guns proved to be impossible to pattern match in shot fall, they reverted back to the British model of demolition with rapid fire guns and missed the point they accidentally found when they tried to match broadside weight of metal.
It was the British practice they subsequently followed and what was expected (by them) to [theoretically] work best.
Trenton would be my answer to the question of what the Americans could do with German type technology. The 17 cm/40 does not exist yet and the 28 cm/35 is a bit too big for the experiment this early. American gun-making science as of 1885 was all imported, with true domestic designs at least a decade away. And if I have to pick a German gun to model I want the best match to purpose I can find. I suppose the 21 cm/40 was possible, but then the mythical Trentons might have to fight genuine (2nd class) British Centurion and Renown class battleships known to be headed or prowling in American waters. The 24cm/35 or 40 Krupp is a good match to the British 10 inch of the era. Its shell can defeat British compound and early cemented steel armor of the era... easily.
And as you can see by my prior comments, the Harvey steel armor scheme I outline is designed to resist 10 inch bore British naval gunfire.