Shipbucket

SALVAGE RIGHTS:

Captain Manuel de Eliza y Vergara, late of the defunct Alfonso XII, whose 16 cm guns have been removed to strengthen the artillery at Battery Chorrera and Battery Regina in the Cobano, has an impossible task to perform. He has to raise, refloat and move out of the way a hazard to navigation inside Havana harbor.

What every fashionable American infantryman carries.



And your cavalry/Marine model

More about these toys after Admiral Sampson's court martial.

Is that...attempted wood grain?

_________________
"The first phase of the operation did not go as planned." - Anonymous

Oh dear lord I hadn't noticed...

_________________
Best regards,

RegiaMarina1939

Cool, though I have to echo the comments re: wood grain. I wouldn't bother and the gunbucket style doesn't show it anyway.

The rear sights look backwards to me. They should move upwards for elevation adjustments starting at the rear, not the front. I suppose it could work the way you've shown it, but as far as I know no rifle ever made was ever done this way so I don't see the reason to show it otherwise.

_________________
USN components, camouflage colors, & reference links (World War II only)

Adjust on the fly, slide ramp sight. without losing sight picture. I\e never seen it used either, (maybe distracting) but the standard K-98 rear sight goes the other way. I wanted different.

Reversing the direction of the slide ramp doesn't mean you wouldn't "lose sight picture"; furthermore, these rifles aren't the type that need that capability if the rear sight is being adjusted in terms of hundreds of meters. Doing something differently just for the sake of doing it differently (without having placed much thought into it) is basically pointless. No service rifle of the time used a sight made that way and I doubt this one would either.

The cross guard of the bayonet also seems to be too wide. The side that wraps around the barrel would by default need to be quite long but the other side can be short (no more than a centimeter or so) just to provide a stop beyond which an enemy blade could not pass.

_________________
USN components, camouflage colors, & reference links (World War II only)

If you are familiar with the K-98, then you know that it is adjusted up down in increments. The range numbers are obscured by the ramp as it elevates, when you adjust for bullet drop at long range, as it is raised. In a vertical ladder sight (Many US and British rifles use this type.), the range bar is raised or lowered and you read the numbers from the ladder without having to dismount from the cheek rest weld. The Germans were satisfied with the "click method" and ramp to range band up and down. But they had to move the rifle to look at the sight if they wanted to do it by the numbers.

In mountain fighting, you do have to shift from near to far often, and that does necessitate adjustment for bullet drop in this type rifle. Additionally, the American soldiers will experience what the Marines actually did with the Navy Lee. Riflelite, the "smokeless" ballistics powder in use in this war was of uneven quality to such an extent, that the blunt nosed 6 x 60mm bullet could exhibit batch characteristics from one bullet stripper clip lot to the next in the same batch that required the Marine to range band up or down in mid fire fight to set his mark for the next round fired. Bullet ballistics were that chemically induced far off. One of the reasons the Navy abandoned the Lee for the Krag and later the Springfield, was this inconsistent propellant performance in the bullets they were supplied. Americans had not learned to make "hot" propellants with consistent quality.

Just some thoughts that went into it.

=================================

The bayonet is pure symmetrical fiction and is intended to be more dagger like than the Krag bayonets, or the previous spike bayonets on rifles Americans used. There is no good reason that the Argentine pattern Mauser bayonet has that curled bayonet blade catch on it, but it is there. In this case, I went with a little artistic license. Knife fighting can be important; and the typical bayonet is not formed with that goal in mind.

William Sampson’s court martial.

In the RTL, after the hideous mess of it made off Santiago de Cuba, by Cervera and Schley (here replicated in the same confusion at Tenerife for my AU history), the initial reaction to the news in the United States about the “victory” was at first jubilation and then some confusion. Obviously, RTL, those who were naval experts (Colbert, Mahan and of course Cervera [See his letters to Bermejo for what he thinks of Spanish chances and Madrid’s general conduct of the RTL war.] understood.) knew that the outcome would be a foregone conclusion.

Still, it was a victory and credit for the victory would boost someone’s reputation. In the RTL, the two chief men who were entitled to some credit for it would come to loggerheads over it. Actually, considering how touchy American naval officers historically proved to be about their reputations (Halsey comes to mind at Leyte Gulf.) about criticism, someone was going to explode in fury, after being called in print, “a caitiff, poltroon and coward.” That was the charge Edgar Stanton MacLay (a disreputable scurrilous author and reporter who wrote the History of the United States Navy) made in his book recounting US naval history to 1900. Schley demanded a formal legal proceeding to clear his name. The reason for Schley’s demand was that he became aware that Admiral Sampson had seen the book’s galley proofs and that man had not demanded that the libelous perjurative statement be removed. What could Schley assume, but that Sampson, who had up to this time conducted a quiet character assassination campaign within the service against Schley, was the original author of that opinion?

It turns out, RTL, that Schley is right. Sampson from the 500+ pages of testimony at Schley’s court-martial, makes spurious claims, deliberately misstates logged facts, contradicts himself in mid testimony and generally comes across as exactly the kind of envious, jealous officer; who wants to somehow compensate himself for the missed opportunity he had, at the expense of some other officer, who was present at the victory that should have been his.

Bad timing and incompetent dispositions seem a poor excuse for Sampson’s ire at Schley. Those are Sampson’s tactical decisions and mistakles he made at Santiago. He cannot blame Schley for Sampson’s leaving the blockade line at a known crisis period, for demanding that the blockade line be static and not under cruise conditions, or for Sampson taking a battleship (USS Massachussetts) and a destroyer from the line, when he could have barged over to see General Shafter and left the battleship and her escorts in place. Admiral Cervera would instantly exploit that hole in the American line when he discovers it, as he does.

Schley can be faulted for the near collision between Brooklyn and Texas, for his abortive move to Cienfuegos when searching for Cervera in the first place, for not cutting loose of the USS Eagle when she broke down, for disregarding Secretary Long’s direct order to proceed to Santiago immediately and for frankly losing control of the surprise battle when it comes upon him as every American ship goes out for herself and chases the 1st Cruiser Squadron willy-nilly. That last mistake derives from his “independent maneuvering as circumstances dictate” order, or Article Four in his fighting instructions. But cowardice is not a charge for which Schley is guilty. George Dewey, the president of that packed court filled with Sampson men, notes in his minority report that Schley is actually efficient, energetic and deserves the victory credit. Dewey, who had some practical experience with Schley’s kinds of problems before Manila with the same kind of contradictory orders, incompetent intelligence from higher authority (Dewey had to find his own. ONI was useless.), and naval jealousies (Admiral Ramsey), is the definitive authorative judgment here, not Admiral Ramsey’s majority opinion as written. History agrees with Dewey.

So, why would Joe Wheeler order a Sampson court martial in this AU? Well, Joe Wheeler is an unreconstructed Civil War Confederate general, who is a victim of his experience with the Army of Tennessee. Whether Johnson or Hood, or Patrick Cleburne, someone was being court martialed or being threatened with court martial for some reason in that army, usually after a disaster having to do with utter incompetence, or misapprehension or misunderstanding of orders, as each officer involved in that politically handicapped and jealous officer riddled army looked for someone else to blame for their collective misfortunes, instead of putting the blame where it belongs. (W.T. Sherman). Joe Wheeler, the cavalry commander in that army, generally stays out of the politics, but even he, after Nashville, wants to put a bullet between Hood’s ears.

Hence, after the talk with our balloonaut, Fuller Albright, who gives his bird’s eye description of the naval battle off Santa Cruz de Tenerife, our extremely efficient competent cavalry general will understand how widely separated, out of contact with each other, naval forces are almost defeated by an inferior enemy. He will immediately conclude (from his practical, not book learned, Confederate army land warfare experience) that this situation could have been prevented with some applied common sense (concentrate forces) and that the single individual person responsible for not showing that common sense is William Sampson.

Such niceties, as Schley losing control of the fleet, the near collisions the confused Americans suffer, Chadwick meandering around by his lonesome and not sticking to Schley as he should have, Watson separating from his destroyers to chase after Schley, and even the random charges of Schley’s personal physical cowardice that Commander Temple Potts, executive officer of the Wyoming (RTL Massachusetts, Potts was not present to see Schley’s actions aboard Brooklyn during the battle.) will give, may play into the general unseemliness of the proceedings, as Schley, Cook, Chadwick, Watson, Sigsbee, et al, give their various accounts of what they did and what they think happened during the battle. In this AU, Cervera never takes any part in the proceedings as his personal honor demands he refuses. Other Spanish prisoners of war follow his example. Sampson, in his own defense, points out to the court martial board (all Army officers by the way, which will be extremely controversial in itself, never mind that the proceeding goes on with Tenerife’s southern two thirds of the island still in Spanish hands and the military campaign still not decided!) that the dispositions and decisions he made, were based on naval factors, such as threat axes of approach, coaling fuel states, weather conditions of wind and waves and esoteric general seafaring knowledge and experience, which no army officer could possibly hope to understand.

Sampson might have a point to that defense. The board (composed of Brigadier General A.K. Arnold (USV) as president, Brigadier General Henry W. Lawton (USV) as first vice president, and Brigadier General Royal T. Frank (RA) as second vice president), will agree that the grounds for a possible guilty verdict seem murky at best. They will therefore recommend no action be taken against Sampson, citing that immediate necessity militates against further unnecessary distractions in the expedition’s operations. Lawton’s minority report will substantially be a disguised frontispiece to Wheeler’s opinion that Sampson screwed up, and hence will form the putative basis for Sampson’s relief. Sampson will be packed off to the States as the return convoy commander taking back the Army’s movable wounded along with the damaged Wyoming, which needs repairs that cannot be accomplished at Tenerife.

The Navy command shuffle will also reflect some criticism of Schley. The scouting force will remain his, but Admiral Watson, Wheeler jumps that man over him in seniority as the overall fleet commander. Note that this all happens under Army auspices and that Wheeler acts as senior American military commander present?

That is going to go over well in Washington, with both President McKinley and Navy Secretary Long. (SARCASM) Sampson is their picked man to command the fleet and their choice for good (to them) political reasons that Schley was not; Roosevelt being those good political reasons.

Now hold on a bit. Is this meant to be a ladder rear sight, or a slide-ramp? If it's a ladder rear sight then I think it might make a little more sense, but it's still rather poorly drawn and I don't think ladder sights show any "ramp" style angle at all. They usually fold down flat on the rifle (this is the case with the Springfield M1903, the Enfield No.4 with ladder sights, and the early Thompson submachineguns even). Either way this drawing needs some work. Take a look at the other Gunbucket rifles described above and copy their format.

_________________
USN components, camouflage colors, & reference links (World War II only)